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Abstract
The paper examines currency crisis theories and applies them in searching for the
main causes of the Russian crisis. We first study the determination of the exchange
rate and then the first and second generation theories on currency crisis and finally
the recent theoretical discussions of the Asian crisis. The main reason for the Rus-
sian crisis was the long-standing federal budget deficit. During the last years the
deficits were financed mainly via short-term domestic debt. This created expecta-
tions of government insolvency and central bank financing. Moreover, the Russian
economy has its own basic weaknesses, which render the country incapable of growth
and prone to crisis. The Asian crisis was a trigger for the Russian crisis. Lower prices
for Russian export products, inadequate financial regulations and lack of informa-
tion in emerging markets in general are factors explaining this contagion effect. But
the main mistakes that led to the crisis were those of the Russians themselves - the
federal budget deficits. Thus the repair work should also start from there.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Financial crises are painful for people, but interesting for economists. Thus,
they have inspired in history many academic studies and this study as well.2
Currency or balance of payment crises during the last two decades can be
divided into four waves: 1) The collapse of the Bretton Woods system started
the first wave in 1976. 2) The debt crisis in Latin America explored the sec-
ond in 1982. 3) The third was the EMS-crisis in 1992. 4) And the recent one
started in Asia in 1997.3 Characteristic for the currency crisis theories has
been progress after the practical crises. Theories have changed to correspond
with the economic circumstances and problems at the given period. Also the
current Asian crisis inspired a new wave of academic research.
The fact that currency crises tend to occur in waves speaks for global
reasons for the crisis. However, the reasons why a particular country at a
given time becomes vulnerable to crisis may differ among countries. Thus,
different theories and explanation might apply for different countries. To
understand properly the present round of currency crises, it behoves econo-
mists and politicians alike to try to understand both the domestic and foreign
causes behind them.
In Russia, the financial and currency crisis became visible in August
1998, when the rouble was floated and the default on treasury bills (GKO)
was announced. Already by the end of September, the rouble had around
35 % of its value before the crisis, monthly inflation was around 45 % and
the GDP was forecast to decrease 6 % for the 1998. Moreover, the crisis has
already had its political and social consequences as well. During the next
months important policy decisions will be made both in the new government
and in the new central bank. How deep and long the Russian crisis will be-
come, depends largely on those decisions. In order to intervene and touch the
right problems in the Russian economy, it is useful to find out the real rea-
sons behind the crisis. The main objective of this paper is to survey the exist-
ing theories on currency crises. With the help of these theories, the paper
aims to find out the main reasons behind the Russian crisis.7
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1.2 High Capital Mobility and Emerging Markets
Capital mobility is a desirable goal. When private capital can flow freely
across countries searching for most efficient use, it can be allocated to the
most efficient use on a global scale. In particular, countries with a low capi-
tal base but high growth prospects should benefit from the capital inflow.4
Since the deregulation of capital markets in the 1980s, developing, newly
industrialised and transition countries have been objects of massive capital
inflow (Baccheta – van Wincoop 1998). Thus, a new market for investors,
emerging markets, was born. During 1984–1989, the yearly net capital in-
flow to these emerging markets was only $15b. During 1990–1996 emerging
markets received yearly almost a $150b net inflow of capital, and in 1996 the
net capital inflow had grown already to $260b. 5 This 16-fold increase was a
huge positive change in the investment possibilities in such poor countries.
However, increased capital mobility also meant increased financial in-
stability (Kamim – Wood 1997). The five crisis countries in Asia (South
Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Philippines) are clear examples of
the instability of capital flows: during 1996 the capital inflow to these coun-
tries was almost $100b, but in 1997, it turned to a capital outflow of $12b.
This turnaround is equivalent to more than 10 % of the GDP of these coun-
tries (Grenville 1998).
With capital outflow, the Indonesian Rupiah lost 80 % of its value in less
than a year; the Russian rouble blew off 65 % of its value in a couple months.
As the fall of currencies is so deep, most of the traditional exchange rate
determination theories work poorly. The asset market approach to exchange
rate determination may offer a clue as it indicates that exchange rates are
determined by investor’s willingness to hold a currency. Like other asset
prices, the exchange rate is determined by expectations about the future
(Shapiro, 1996). Can rapid changes in investors’ expectations towards emerg-
ing markets explain the huge capital flows and price changes?
Currency crisis theories aim to explain the huge capital outflows and fast
depreciation of currencies, although country fundamentals do not support so
huge movements. First generation currency crisis theories start with the weak
country fundamentals, such as excessive expansionary monetary and fiscal
policy, which are then unsustainable with a currency peg. In these first gen-
eration theories, country fundamentals play a major role in crisis. In the sec-
ond-generation theories investors’ expectations are more important. From this8
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theoretical debate arises then the more practical dispute around the question:
Can currency crisis arise even with sustainable domestic fundamentals? 6
As the first and second generation theories do not explain the current
crises in emerging markets, ”new wave” theories have emerged. These theo-
ries stress the characteristics of these countries, particularly banking system
weaknesses, as the cause of the crisis. Clearly the high capital mobility has
changed the economic environment and introduced the alarming contagion
effect of currency crises. Now as crises occur at one part of the world, inves-
tors will seek the weak points from all emerging market countries.
1.3 The Basic Weaknesses of the Russian Economy
To understand the unique vulnerability of the Russian economy in the sum-
mer of 1998, some of the basic weaknesses and characteristics of the Rus-
sian economy deserve note.7 Although these weaknesses are not the acute
reasons for the crisis, they are most likely behind the crisis. The list of weak-
nesses given here is not complete and is written in a short, uncomplicated
format.
Insider ownership
The ownership structure of the Russian enterprises is inefficient for eco-
nomic growth. The fast privatisation method used resulted in an ownership
structure, where insiders employees and especially managers – own the ma-
jority in most of the Russian enterprises. Although the share of the outsider
owners has increased since the privatisation, managers are actually still in
control in most cases.
8 There are several reasons why insider ownership struc-
ture is inefficient in the Russian case. Managers and employees are keen on
retaining their jobs, which results in employment hoarding, although the en-
terprises would need restructuring. Further, these insider managers have in-
herited a Soviet style of management, which most likely is not appropriate to
the circumstances in a market economy.
More importantly, these Russian insiders have lacked interest in capital
investments in their enterprises, tending to focus on creating positive cash
flows for themselves instead. In 1997, the overall capital investments in the
production sectors (industry, agriculture, transportation and communication)
were only 17 % of the level in 1990 (Gaddy – Ickes 1998). The positive cash
flow is produced by wearing out the old capital base, like raw materials and9
Currency crisis theories — some explanations for the Russian case
BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/1999
machines. This kind of positive cash flow does not mean that the enterprises
are profitable (Sutela 1998b). The lack of capital by the insiders themselves,
their unwillingness to sell the majority stake of their enterprises and to give
information to outside investors have been major reasons for the lack of
investments and economic growth in the Russian economy.
No trust – no savings
Russian banks are small. The common assets of the Russian banks in spring
1998 were around 35 % of GDP. This is low even compared to other emerg-
ing markets countries. (Banks assets in Brazil are 72 %, in Poland 60 % and
in most developed countries more than 100 % of GDP). Moreover, an abnor-
mally large part of banks assets were invested to government paper (35 % of
assets in spring 1998), while an abnormally small part was lent to non-finan-
cial private enterprises (39 % of assets in spring 1998) (CBR 1998). Thus,
what little capital Russian banks had was heavily invested in financing the
public deficit, not in urgently needed private investments.
Russians do not save, at least in the accounts of the Russian banks. The
official savings rate has been around 25 %, but studies with reasonable ad-
justments by RECEP (1996) and by Gregory (1997) estimate the true savings
rate to be around 10–12 %.9 This is alarmingly low compare to other transi-
tion countries where the savings rate is around 18 % or even 20–30 % in
Asian countries.
Why don’t Russians save? The first reason is the hyperinflation history
in 1992–1995, as the rouble savings were lost. The low inflation policy dur-
ing 1995–1998 by the Central Bank of Russia and the governments did not
earn the credibility among Russians. The practise to use Russian banks as
tax collectors makes enterprises to avoid accounts in Russian banks. And
finally, the bankruptcies of different financial institutions in 1992–93 re-
duced the credibility of Russian banks. These reasons have increased the
capital flight and the use of dollars as store of value. Unfortunately, the para-
noia of Russians to ascribe low credibility to the rouble and Russian banks
was justified.
No monetary economy
The monetisation of Russian economy is low. The ratio of M2 to GDP has
been only 12–17 % in 1997–98 (RECEP 1998). The low use of the roubles
makes the economy inefficient. Instead of roubles, Russians use dollars. The10
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results vary, but even conservative estimates put the current value of dollars
among Russians higher then the value of roubles. Barter is also prevalent.
Approximately half of the industrial production is exchanged through barter.
Finally, enterprises use various substitutes, like promissory notes, in paying
their bills, e.g. taxes. All these substitutes for roubles harm the operation of
the enterprises and hamper tax policy.
Virtual economy
Gaddy and Ickes (1998) have cleverly formulated the expression ”virtual
economy” to explain the characteristics of the Russian economy. On the top
of their model are the non-payment arrears. The enterprises do not pay their
suppliers, their workers, their taxes. And if they do, it is with cash substi-
tutes. By June 1998, the total arrears in the economy had grown to around
45 % compared to the GDP (RECEP 1998). These arrears create illusory, or
virtual earnings, virtual fiscal obligations and virtual prices. The existence
of this virtual economy means that the Russian economy is actually smaller
than what Goskomstat reports.10
Macroeconomic transition – no government transition
Consumer and industrial prices have been liberalised in Russia. Around 80 %
of the Russian economy are produced by private enterprises. Inflation was
stabilised to 10–20 % level during 1996–97. Thus, the first parts of the suc-
cessful economic transition towards market economy given in various text
books (like Blanchard et al. 1991) was achieved in the Russian economy
before the August 1998 crisis. These are the respectable macroeconomic re-
sults of the former governments and Dubinin’s Central Bank.
Firstly, what is lacking in the Russian economy is enterprise restructur-
ing. Although the economy has shrunk around 30–50 % since 1991 and half
of the enterprises report losses, bankruptcies have been only few (RECEP
1998 and Gaddy – Ickes 1998). Employee notices have been few as well.
Like already said, investments to new capital base have been almost non-
existent. To put it simply, old Soviet era enterprises continue to run as al-
ways. New, smaller enterprises have not emerged as in Poland and China
(RECEP 1997).
Second, the transition of the government is missing. Shleifer (1997) wisely
added the transition of the government as an important reform towards pros-
perous market economy. The transition or changes do not mean only the11
Currency crisis theories — some explanations for the Russian case
BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/1999
federal government, but politicians and officials in all level in the public
administration. They are responsible for building the institutions for the en-
terprises and citizens to operate. In Poland and the Czech Republic, both the
structure and the persons of the public administration have changed rapidly
and deeply (Scheifer 1997). In Russia, we see little more than some ministe-
rial job rotation. Because of the absence of government transition, no effi-
cient public institutions have been created. The lack of efficient public insti-
tutions enables all these weaknesses of the Russian economy.
2 Currency Crisis Theories
This chapter starts with exchange rate determination theories. After which
currency crisis theories are presented in three waves. First generation theo-
ries are based on monetary and fiscal imbalance. The second generation theo-
ries take into account investor expectation on government behaviour. These
expectations render the currency crisis self-fulfilling. The most recent theo-
ries explain the spillover and contagion effect, underdevelopment of bank-
ing sector and market segmentation and herding behaviour. These were de-
vised mostly to explain the Asian crisis. 11 All of these theories, even the old
ones, can explain a given currency crisis. Moreover, in a currency crisis sev-
eral explanations may apply. The data from the Russian economy is pre-
sented after every theoretical section. Experience from other countries, mostly
from the Asian countries, appears in the footnotes.
2.1 Exchange Rate Determination
Purchasing power parity approach
Exchange rate determination theories can be divided into purchasing power,
balance of payment and asset market approaches.12 The purchasing power
approach stresses the price task of exchange rates. It states that the value of a
currency is determined by the ratio of domestic prices relative to the level of
prices abroad. The absolute form implies that the equilibrium exchange rate
between two countries is determined by the ratio of the two countries na-
tional price levels. According to the relative version of PPP, the percentage
change in the equilibrium exchange rate between two countries is determined
by the percentage difference in two countries’ inflation (Rosenberg 1996).12
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Thus, we get excessive inflation as a reason of exchange rate depreciation.
Neither of the forms of the purchasing power theory have received validity
in empirical testing particularly in the short-term or between developing and
developed countries (Krugman – Obstfeld 1997). In the longer term, how-
ever, exchange rates exhibit a tendency towards their PPP levels (Rosenberg
1996).
During 1995–1997 inflation was higher than rouble depreciation. Thus,
the rouble appreciated around 100 % in real terms (Figure 1). However, it is
extremely difficult to estimate an equilibrium exchange rate level for an tran-
sition country, and it is difficult to assume that the real exchange rate level in
1995 was an equilibrium level. Moreover, the Russian price and especially
the wage level before the crisis in 1998 was not higher than in most of the
other transition countries in Eastern Europe. 
13





























































Source: Russian Economic Trends, BOFIT. 1995 = 100.
It is useful here to go deeper to one reason for fast inflation and currency
depreciation. Assuming the velocity of money and the growth of output con-
stant, the quantity theory of money says, that the growth of money deter-
mines the rate of inflation (Mankiw 1992). There are two major reasons for
the government to be interested in excessive money creation. First, if the13
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government is unable to keep its budget in balance, it may ask the central
bank to cover the deficit with new emissions. Second, if the government has
a large debt burden, which is denominated in the domestic currency, great
money emissions will inflate the real value of the debt away. Thus, we get
large budget deficit and government debt as reasons for inflation and cur-
rency depreciation expectations.
14
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Source: RECEP, Russian economic trends, various issues. The figures are accord-
ing to IMF definition during 1992–1998. The figure for 1998 includes only the
seven first months.
Russia’s budget deficit was large for years. The deficit in the federal budget
has varied around 5–11 % of GDP during 1992–98. During 1992–1994 Rus-
sian government was unable to receive domestic or foreign credits to finance
its deficits. In 1993, 100 % and in 1994 77 % of the deficit were financed
with credits from the CBR. In 1995 the domestic treasury bill (GKO) market
was created and so after 1995 the government was able to receive domestic
loans. In 1997 and the first quarter of 1998, Russia was able to receive also
foreign loans, Eurobonds, syndicated loans and IMF credits.14
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Source: OECD, JPMorgan, Fitch IBCA, Goskomstat and RECEP. The internal
debt includes Treasury bills and bonds (GKOs, OFZs, and OVVZs) and no other
debt items.
The stock of federal debt became unsustainable. The stock of debt was still
at moderate levels (around 20–30 % of GDP) during 1993–1995 (Figure 3).
During 1995–96 the government piled on credit while the economy sank
fast. And in 1997 and 1998 the governments continued to take new credits as
the economy started to show signs of recovery. Thus, the stock of debt com-
pared to GDP was over 50 % when crisis hit in August 1998.15 Korhonen
(1998) observes that Russia would have needed real high GDP growth to be
able to service the debt and keep the debt stock at reasonable levels in the
future. The alternative would have been to run large primary surpluses in the
federal budget, which did not occur. Thus, it was quite reasonable that inves-
tors abandoned the new credits from the Russian government.
The stock of rouble-denominated domestic debt was only 15–20 % of
GDP, but, in principle, this debt was possible to be inflated away with new
money creation. External debt cannot be inflated away. Russia’s external15
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debt is around USD 140 billion. On the contrary, if and as the rouble depre-
ciates, it will be even more difficult to pay back the external debt denomi-
nated in foreign currency. Thus, defaults on external debt look now inevita-
ble.
Balance of payments approach
Exchange rate is also the equilibrium of demand and supply. The balance of
payments approach says that the equilibrium exchange rate is determined
when the net inflow of foreign exchange arising from current account trans-
actions just match the net outflow of foreign exchange arising from capital
account transaction (Rosenberg 1996). Historically, international trade drove
balance of payment flows. For example, if a country imports more than ex-
ports, the current account deficit has to be balanced with capital inflow in
capital account. If there is not enough capital inflow by private investors to
compensate the current account deficit, the official reserves will decrease
and the exchange rate might come under pressure.16








1994 1995 1996 1997 1Q98
current account
capital account
Source: RECEP 1998, BOFIT. The figures are in USD billion.16
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Russia has had a healthy current account surplus. With huge trade surpluses
(around USD 20b yearly) the current account has been nicely positive during
1994–1997. However, because of tax evasion efforts, the actual current ac-
count figures are most likely worse.17 At the end of 1997 and more in the start
of 1998 the lower raw material prices turned the current account to small
deficit. However, this small current account deficit, was not the main reason
for the currency crisis in Russia.
Asset market approach
Capital flows registered in the capital account can influence reserves and
exchange rates per se. The asset market approach to exchange rate determi-
nation indicates that the exchange rate is determined by investor’s willing-
ness to hold each currency. And like other asset prices, the exchange rate is
determined by investors expectations about the future (Solnik 1996). First,
the uncovered interest parity states, that the interest rate on domestic bond is
equal to the interest rate on foreign bond plus the expected rate of apprecia-
tion of foreign currency. This view assumes that the foreign and domestic
bonds are perfect substitutes.
The portfolio balance approach is an extension of the asset market ap-
proach. It assumes that domestic and foreign non-money assets are imperfect
substitutes. International investors will hold a diversified portfolio of non-
money assets and the proportion of each asset depends upon its particular
risk-return characteristics (Pentecost 1993). Expectations on interest rate,
currency and country risk influence the investors’ decision to buy, for exam-
ple, treasury bills in a given country. As an example, poor revenue expecta-
tions in the government budget raise expectations of insolvency, and can be
a reason for currency depreciation. The expectations about the solvency of
the debtor or economic growth influence the capital flows particularly to-
wards emerging markets, because capital flows towards emerging markets
are dominated by portfolio investments (Bacchetta – van Wincoop 1998).
While capital flight is attributed to be the reason for economic problem
in Russia, it is difficult to determine and estimate the value of it (the esti-
mates vary around $10b–$40b yearly). Partly the capital flight was normal
international diversification of investments by the Russians, but part was tax
avoidance or criminal behaviour. Anyway, the ”capital flight” partly ren-
dered the capital account negative until 1997. With foreign investments to
Russia the capital account turned positive in 1997 and was still positive in17
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the first quarter of 1998. The capital inflow also enabled the lower GKO
rates of 15–20 % in 1997.
In 1998, as the investors started to fear a default by the Russian govern-
ment, investors sold their GKOs. This exacerbated both capital outflow and
currency crisis. In the Russian case, it is most likely that investors were opti-
mistic or did not receive the right information in 1996–1997 about the growth
prospects of the Russian economy or about the situation in the federal budget.
This led to high equity prices and low GKO yields in 1997. As the more
realistic picture emerged the capital inflow ceased in 1998.
2.2 First Generation Theories
First generation, or traditional, currency crisis theories originate from the
work of Salant and Henderson (1978), and were formalised by Krugman
(1979). Krugman’s (1979) and (1996) models have a country using reserves
to peg its exchange rate. The model assumes interest parity conditions and
that the government cannot use foreign borrowing. The government runs a
budget deficit, which it must cover by domestic credit or by money creation.
The continuing expansion of domestic credit or money base will lead to in-
flation, depreciation expectations and capital outflow. Accordingly, the cen-
tral bank’s reserves gradually decline. At some point, generally well before
the gradual depletion of reserves would have exhausted them, there is a sud-
den, massive speculative attack that wipes out the reserves. This speculative
attack is driven by the natural outcome of maximising behaviour or risk-
averse behaviour by investors.
Several authors have since extended Krugman’s work. The timing of the
speculative attack and currency crisis was solved by Flood – Garber (1984).
It was solved both in a perfect-foresight model and in a stochastic market
model without perfect foresight.18 Connolly – Taylor (1984) introduced traded
and non-tradable goods to the models. Their implication was that loss of
competitiveness and the current account deficit cause the currency crisis.
The effect of price flexibility on the collapse time was highlighted by
Blackburn (1988). Blackburn (1988) introduced imperfect asset substitut-
ability into his models. Willman (1988) also assumed that domestic goods
and bonds are not perfect substitutes, and that nominal wages might be sticky.
His insight was that it is not just monetary policy, but rather the mix of fiscal,
monetary and incomes policies, that are important for currency crises.18
Tuomas Komulainen
Institute for Economies in Transition
Similar for these traditional or first generation models is that they as-
sume weak country fundamentals, which are known to be unsustainable with
the current fixed exchange rate. This then establishes a unique relationship
between the fundamentals and the timing of crisis (Krugman 1996). Krugman
(1996) formulates, that the critical level of reserves determines the timing
for the speculative attack and crisis, which is the level at which, in mind of
the investors, the speculative attack can succeed.
 19
First generation theories are appropriate for the Russian crisis. The defi-
cit and debt burden in the federal government budget augmented expecta-
tions of future money creation and depreciation of the rouble. The demand
for roubles became so low that high interest rates by the CBR for half a year
did not restore the credibility. The currency, GKO and equity –markets were
exhausted and ruined during the spring and summer of 1998. Thus, there was
not a sudden speculative attack, which caused the crisis. Although the long-
standing budget deficit was the main reason for the Russian crisis, there was
also some self-fulfilling and foreign reasons as well.
2.3 Second Generation Theories
The EMS crisis in 1992–93 and Latin American crisis in 1994–95 inspired a
new wave of currency crisis theories. Unlike the earlier models, these sec-
ond-generation models take into account the policy adjustment by the au-
thorities in response to the attack. Obstfeld (1986) first observed this short-
coming of the earlier models. He observed that the government faces the
trade-off to defend and carry the costs or to abandon the fixed rate. The costs
to defend the exchange rate arise, for example, as the higher interest rates
cause unemployment. 20 These costs then create investor’s expectations that
the exchange rate might be abandoned, which increases the costs (interest
rates) even further. Whereas, the motivation to defend the fixed rate is e.g.: it
facilitates international trade and investment, or the fixed rate works as a
guarantor of low inflation (Obstfeld 1994 and Krugman 1998b).
The trade-off rises the possibility of multiple equilibrium. The two equi-
librium are: 1) no attack, no change in fundamentals and indefinite mainte-
nance of the peg. And 2) an attack and new fundamentals, which will be
validated after the exchange rate change that investors expects to take place
(Eichegreen – Rose – Wyplosz 1996). This possibility of two equilibrium
facilitates self-fulfilling crisis, and only small change in expectations may19
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trigger the speculative attack.
21
A sudden shift in market sentiment regarding the government’s willing-
ness to tolerate unemployment trigger the currency depreciation that would
not happen under different investors expectations.23 If the credibility and
track record of the government is weak, these expectations might be truly
self-fulfilling, although the initial output shock had been neutral. In the
Obstfelds (1994) first model the market participants expect the currency to
be devalued at a given rate and set the nominal interest rates at the corre-
sponding level. Because of high unemployment or high debt burden, the higher
rates makes the peg to the government too costly to hold.22 In the second
Obstfeld (1994) model, devaluation expectations are triggered by the gov-
ernments expected desire to offset a negative output shock.
Further reasons creating self-fulfilling expectations on currency crises
due to authorities behaviour are expected problems in the banking sector.
When market interest rates rise as the central bank defends the peg, banks
may get into trouble.24 The government desire to sidestep a costly bailout at
public expense may render the government reluctant to use higher interest
rates. These expectations make the speculative attack self-fulfilling. Simi-
larly, the expectations that the central bank exercise its lender-of-last-resort
function by expanding the monetary base expose devaluation expectations
(Obstfeld 1996a).25
Although many claim these second-generation models ignore fundamen-
tals (Esquivel – Larrain 1998), the Obstfelds (1996a and 1996b) notion is
closer to reality. He points that in second-generation theories fundamentals
are far from irrelevant to the outcome, as they determine the range of possi-
ble equilibria. He stresses that in reality there exists a ”grey area” in which
multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling crises are possible. First generation
models were too strict having just a pegged rate, which may or may not be
sustainable given the fundamentals.
Kiriyenko’s Government and Dubinin’s Central Bank were ready to carry
the cost of high interest, when they defended the peg of the rouble. The
market participants, however, understood that the government finances were
unsustainable, and demanded higher GKO rates. Consequently, in the first
three months of 1998 the debt service costs were 35 % of the total budget
spending (Helmenstein – Krylova 1998). Thus, there were also some self-
fullfilling or circular aspects in the Russian crisis. So far we have only con-
sidered domestic reasons for currency crisis. Although the domestic reasons20
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for the Russian crisis looks sufficient, the timing of the crisis is still obscure.
What happened during autumn 1997 and spring 1998 to turn the of capital
net inflow into an outflow that ruined markets?
2.4 Spillover-effects and Contagion
Next we turn to the truly recent theories on currency crisis. The external
reasons for the currency crisis will first be discussed. In the recent crisis in
Asia, the fall of the Thai Baht preceded the abandon of exchange rate pegs in
the neighbouring countries and in other emerging markets like Russia. It is
easier to understand that Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines had to leave
the peg after the fall of the baht. These four countries were more linked by
foreign trade and had similar weak fundamentals (especially current account
deficit). More curiously, Hong Kong and Singapore, with strong current ac-
count and fiscal positions and less trade linkages, were also briefly exposed
to downward pressure on their currencies. Later Korea and Russia also suc-
cumbed to this contagion effect (Masson 1998) (Figure 5).
These events and regression tests have raised the question of foreign
influence to the currency crisis. 26 The foreign influence to a currency crisis
can be divided into two parts: spillover and contagion-effect.
27 The spillover
effect focuses on trade linkages and on the loss of price competitiveness
associated to a depreciation of a competitor country. Where as the contagion
term refers to the change in market sentiment.
Spillover effects
Gerlach-Smets (1994) were inspired by the loss of competitiveness in Swe-
den after collapse of the Finnish markka in 1991–1992. In their model the
collapse of the first currency leads to real appreciation of the second, which
depresses income and prices in the second country. This reduces the demand
for money, causes loss of foreign exchange reserves and increases the prob-
ability of succeed attack in the second country. They note that the spillover
effect is stronger, the lower the degree of real and nominal wage flexibility,
the higher the degree of trade integration between the two countries and the
less integrated the two countries are with the anchor country.21
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Source: Bank of Finland. 100 = 2 Jan. 1997. The data for other currencies end at
25 Aug. 1998 and for Russia 30 Sept. 1998.
Inspired by the 1997–98 Asian crisis, Corsetti – Pesenti – Roubini (1998)
used game theory to model a competitive devaluation. They used a three-
country centre-periphery model, where two periphery countries A and B uni-
laterally peg their currencies to the centre country C currency (say, dollar).
They assume no intraperiphery trade, citizens in the centre country consume
both domestic and imported goods and perfect substitutability between the
two periphery country goods. Periphery country A is hit by a shock, which
forces it to devalue. Country C consumption of the B country products falls
to zero and the output of A country increases. To maintain the peg against the
centre, country B must accept a sharp contraction in economic activity, con-
sumption and welfare. However, the investors perceive a devaluation of the
country B as the optimal response to the sharp devaluation of the weak-
fundamental country A, and country B is forced to devalue as well.28 A sec-
ond implication of the Corsetti et al game model is that a coordinated re-
sponse to the shock will lead to less depreciation of A and B currencies than22
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a non-coordinated case.
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Raw materials, left scale
Source: Bank of Finland.
The spillover-effect also occurs when the anchor country rises its interest
rates. Buiter – Corsetti – Pesenti (1996) studied the N + 1 problem in a world
where the centre meets a shock. The centre country raises interest rates, which
causes the others to leave the system collectively. Here we see an extreme
case of contagion. In a more selective case, some leave the system, some
keep the peg. Thus, the spillover effect may influence countries differently.29
Masson (1998) cleverly named the higher interest rates in developed coun-
tries in general as a ”monsoonal” effect to the emerging markets financial
crisis. Dooley – Fernandez-Arias – Kletzer (1996) find the interest rate in
developed countries and the creditworthiness of the recipient country as the
main factors explaining movements of developing countries Treasury bills23
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prices.
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The spillover-effect from Asia to Russian economy was influenced mainly
through lower raw material prices. Crude oil, oil products and metals repre-
sented 40 % of Russian exports in 1997. Due to the fall in demand in Asia,
raw material prices started to decline heavily during the second half of 1997
(Figure 6). This caused expectations of future current account deficits in
Russia, which also materialised in the 1Q of 1998 (Figure 4). More impor-
tantly, the lower raw material prices decreased the ability of Russian enter-
prises to pay taxes and further hampered the government finances. As the
value of Russian enterprises was decreased at least partly because of lower
raw material prices, privatisation plans had to be postponed as well.
Contagion
The term ”contagion” refers to the change in the market sentiment. The con-
tagion effect was first discussed after the Mexico crisis spread to Argentina,
Chile and other emerging markets in 1995. At that time it was named the
”Tequila” effect and now the ”Vodka” effect. Sachs – Tornell – Velasco (1996)
start their explanation with an investor, who considers investing in emerging
markets during a period of turbulence. For a given nominal return, the real
return can be adversely affected by a large depreciation or default. Even if
”bad” policy or decreasing times are viewed as transitory, investors able to
allocate resources at relatively low costs will park their wealth elsewhere
until the dust settles. During these times also governments are unable to roll
over short-term debt and may have to amortise obligations earlier than an-
ticipated. The net effect is a massive capital outflow from the country and
from the whole region. Although this explanation for the contagion effect is
illustrative, it is not a sufficient one.
As the crisis elsewhere work as signal to the investors, the contagion
effect is related to the multiple equilibrium (Esquivel – Larrain 1998). In the
second-generation theories the trigger, which causes investors to expect the
abandon of the peg, was obscure. Currency crisis abroad may work as this
trigger. Inconveniently, even if the domestic fundamentals had not changed,
foreign crisis will lead investors to reassess the fundamentals of similar coun-
tries as well (Masson 1998). The crisis in one country renders investors more
risk averse towards all similar assets or towards similar information. Thus, if
the home country’s fundamentals are in the Obstfeld’s grey area and similar
countries leave the peg, home country will also encounter a speculative at-24
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tack. However, what the similarities exactly mean and which countries should
be involved in the crisis are still open questions (Wyplotz 1998).
Masson (1998) tries to model the contagion effect. Depreciation or higher
interest rates abroad will increase the expected debt burden by the domestic
government. This moves the country into the grey area, where speculative
attack is possible. Masson’s model consists of two emerging market coun-
tries and an external environment that determines the risk-free interest rate.
One emerging market is the home country and it has external debt. The inter-
est rate to the debt depends on foreign interest rates, probability of devalua-
tion and percent devaluation expected.
Two channels in the Masson´s (1998) model by which the currency crisis
in emerging market may coincide: 1) foreign risk-free interest rate and 2)
devaluation by the other emerging market country. The source of uncertainty
in Masson’s model is a shock to the trade balance in one of the emerging
market countries. The probability of attack and devaluation in the home coun-
try depends negatively on the level of reserves and expected trade balance,
and positively on stock of debt, foreign interest rates and possibility of com-
petitor devaluation. Masson states also that the model should be further ex-
tended to include rollover risk, banking sector problems and the existence of
risk-averse investors.31
The currency devaluations in Asia worked as a trigger in the Russian
case. Investors became more risk averse towards all emerging markets and
started to look more carefully the fundamentals in Russia as well. It is possi-
ble to argue that, due to the Asian crisis, debt service costs rose and moved
Russia into the Obstfeld’s grey area, making a currency crisis possible. It is
still obscure, however, why an investor would see emerging markets as one
investment area and not distinguish among emerging market countries.
2.5 Underdevelopment of the Banking Sector
Underdevelopment of the banking sector has been stressed as a main reason
for the recent crisis in Asia. These theories point the liberalisation of finan-
cial markets, inadequate legal infrastructure and illiquidity as reasons for
crises.
Banking crises and currency crises are highly related. Kaminsky –
Reinhardt (1996) studied the links between currency crisis and banking cri-
sis in 25 crisis in 20 countries.32 They give four different explanations and25
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chain of causation how these two crisis are linked: 1) The speculative attack
on the currency is followed by a period of abnormally high interest rates, as
the central bank attempts to defend the parity. This decreases private banks
assets. In this case, the balance of payment crisis occurs before the banking
crisis. 2) As the central bank finances the bailout of troubled financial insti-
tutions, its ability to maintain the peg erodes. 3) The consumption/invest-
ment boom is usually financed by bank credits. Banks have borrowed abroad
and short-term. The consumption and investment boom erodes the current
account, which at some point can be perceived unsustainable by investors
and a speculative attack occurs. The capital inflow becomes an outflow, as-
set markets crash and the banking system caves in. 4) The financial liberali-
sation without relevant regulator laws may be the cause for the same boom-
bust dynamics.
The last two cases are more studied in Kamim – Wood (1997) and they
introduced the following series of events: stabilisation and liberalisation of
financial markets, which improves the investment environment. Capital in-
flow and real appreciation of the currency, which leads to widening of the
current account. Accumulation of international reserves by the central bank,
which is reflected in an expansion of monetary aggregates and bank credits
(see also Calvo 1998). Expansion of the loanable funds, which leads to fast
increases in consumption and investment. Increases in private net indebted-
ness and the emergence of non-performing loans.33 Reversal of capital flow,
which may lead to further speculative attacks against the currency. This seems
to give a good explanation about the Asian crisis, although the Kamim and
Wood (1997) paper was already written to the Mexico crisis in 1995.
Krugman (1998a and 1998b) stresses moral hazard as a cause of the Asian
crisis. He starts with financial intermediates, whose liabilities were perceived
as having an implicit government guarantee, but were unregulated. This in-
duced risky lending, which induced inflation of asset prices. This
”overpricing” of assets was sustained by circular process, in which prolifera-
tion of risky lending drove up the prices of risky assets, making the condition
of financial intermediates seem sounder than it was. When the bubble burst,
the virtuous circle turned vicious. Falling asset prices make the insolvency
of intermediaries visible, forcing them to seek liquidity or to cease opera-
tion, leading to further asset deflation.
Obstfeld (1998) emphasises the attempt to assure fixed exchange rates.
When domestic banks and corporate borrowers are (over)confident in the26
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exchange rate, they may borrow in dollar terms without adequately hedging
against the exchange rate risk. If devaluation occurs, it raises the ratio of
their domestic-currency liabilities to their assets and deepens the vicious
circle further. Moreover, banks may believe that even if crisis occurs, the
government’s promise to peg the exchange rate represents an implicit prom-
ise of an bail out. Maybe more to the point, McKinnon and Pill (1998) stress
that failure to limit the exposure of banks to foreign exchange risk, increases
the magnitude of the boom.
Unlike the Asian crisis, the Russian economy did not receive huge capi-
tal inflows before the crisis. The Russian economy never experienced an
investment/consumption boom like many Asian and Latin American coun-
tries. Moreover, Russian banks did not have time to be largely involved in
the new borrowing possibilities abroad, which opened in the 1990s for the
other emerging markets. Russian banks received only around two billion
dollars worth of eurobonds and syndicated loans during 1997 and early 1998.
Thus, bank assets remained small compared to other emerging markets (Fig-
ure 7) and Russian banks did not start to finance investments or consumption
in the private part of the economy. Of course, this thinness of the financial
sector made the crisis worse later.
Russian banks were not adequately prepared for the exchange risk. On
the contrary, they underwrited forward contracts (estimates vary between
$5b–$20b) to foreign investors. Secondly, Russian banks suffered huge losses
as the value of GKO’s decreased and became illiquid in August 1998. Unlike
in the Asian crisis, the Russian banking crisis materialised after the currency
crisis and insolvency of the Russian government.
Next we turn to the weak financial infrastructure in emerging markets,
which render the capital flows unstable and currency crises more probable.
Knight (1998) listed a supportive legal and regulatory environment, strong
internal governance, external discipline provided by market forces, and ex-
ternal governance provided by regulation and supervision at both the domes-
tic and international level as basic elements of a sound financial system. It
requires a legal framework that facilitates the enforcement of financial con-
tracts, loan recovery, and the realization of collateral. Moreover, a supervi-
sion body that limits the open currency positions is highly needed. Such
infrastructure is clearly lacking in most emerging markets. Further charac-
teristics for the emerging markets is the illiquidity as the access from emerg-
ing markets to world capital markets is limited to few issuers only. Moreo-27
Currency crisis theories — some explanations for the Russian case
BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/1999
ver, information on issuers is costly or even impossible to receive.
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Source: Alfa Capital. Figures are for the first half of 1998.
In such environments even a small exogenous change such as world interest
rates, terms of trade or devaluation by other countries, may result in finan-
cial distress. A creditor panic leads to a refusal to roll over short-term loans
and even bank runs. And banks face costly liquidation of their assets. Weak
infrastructure and illiquidity aspect has inspired some currency crisis mod-
els.
Chang–Velasco (1998) placed the illiquidity of the financial system at
the centre of their currency crisis model. They assume banks to take liquid
deposit and invest part of the proceeds in illiquid assets. Even small capital
outflows may cause banking crisis.
34 The illiquidity may be born also by the
government finances. Governments in emerging markets often have to bor-
row in short-term debt papers. If the government’s credibility is decreased in
an investor’s mind, investors refuse to roll over the expiring debt.35 The gov-
ernment is left with the unpleasant options: 1) outright repudiation, 2) invol-28
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untary debt rescheduling, 3) persuade the private sector to roll over the debt
or 4) tough measures towards the budget, which will contract the real economy.
All these options either limit the government’s access to world capital mar-
ket further or decrease the growth prospects of the economy. This will deepen
the crisis even further (Calvo 1998).
In emerging markets, the illiquidity aspect increases the contagion effect
as well. If agents want to change their portfolios in one country, they will
cash their claims asking for liquidity. If they do not find the liquidity in the
first country they will seek for it in the second one (usually another emerging
market country). The illiquidity in the first country will influence the size of
the withdrawals in the second country (Valdes 1998). This run for liquidity
effect was operating at least in the Asian crisis and affected other emerging
markets as well.
Figure 8: Maturity Structure of Rouble Debt in May 1998
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In Russia, banks liabilities were more liquid then their assets. Financial mar-
kets were illiquid as well. These rendered the economy more vulnerable for
crisis. However, the illiquidity born by the government is the more suitable29
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reason for the Russian crisis. As the domestic debt of Russian government
was highly short-term (Figure 8) and in the summer 1998 investors refused
to roll over the debt anymore, the Kiriyenko government was left with few
options. First it proposed a voluntary debt rescheduling and later it tried to
impose a mandatory one. Thus, the short maturity of government debt was
clearly a technical reason for the Russian crisis.
2.6 Market Segmentation and Herding Behaviour
Can inefficient international financial markets be a reason for the contagion
effect? 36 Investor’s expectation and preferences towards assets in a country
or group of countries influence the capital flows and may cause currency
crisis. If financial markets were internationally efficient, massive turnarounds
in capital flows and currency crisis would not happen without really a dra-
matic new information. However, as Table 1 shows, the capital inflows to
emerging markets in 1996 have diminished quite heavily. The turnaround
occurred during few months in the autumn of 1997. Particularly, the Asian
countries lost all the massive inflows of foreign investments.
Table 1: Net Capital Flows to Emerging Markets (in billion USD)
Net capital flows 1984–89 1990–96 1996 1997 1998E
Total emerging markets 15 148 241 174 122
Asian countries 13 56 102 39 2
Countries in transition 0 13 21 35 35
Source: IMF 1998. For the items 1984–89 and 1990–96 the figures are yearly aver-
ages during the period. For the 1998 the figure is an estimate and might prove to be
too large. Net capital flows include: net direct investment, net portfolio investment,
official-, private borrowing, other long- and short-term net investment flows.
Studies and theories in international finance can be divided into three cat-
egories (Bakaert – Harvey 1995): 1) integrated 2) segmented or 3) partially
segmented markets. The international asset pricing theories (IAPT and
ICAPM) say that markets are completely integrated if assets with same risk
have identical expected returns irrespective of the market. In other words,
the reward for various investment risks is the same in each market. Risk
refers here to exposure to some common world factor.37
Financial markets are said to be segmented if securities with the same30
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risk characteristics but listed in two different markets have different value
(Solnik 1996). In other words, in segmented markets the cost of capital and
the corresponding value of an investment will generally depend on the mar-
ket in which the project is financed. Segmentation may arise either because
of government impediments to capital movements or because of individuals’
attitude or irrationality (Gultekin – Gultekin – Penati 1989). In fact, all asset
pricing studies using only one country data assume that domestic capital
market is completely segmented.
The third class of theories assumes the global markets to be partially
segmented, which might also be cautiously proven by the empirical results.38
Bekaert – Harvey (1995) introduce a measure of capital market integration
for individual market. They found that a number of emerging market are
partially segmented, and that the integration or segmentation is time varying.
Valdes (1998) studied the correlation of secondary debt prices among seven
Latin American countries during 1979 and 1994, and found significant cor-
relation. Moreover, he found that the correlation is stronger for negative
movements. Patel – Sarkar (1998) studied nine stock market crisis during
1970–1997 in 18 countries. They found strong evidence of contagion within
regions, in that most countries in a region participate in a crisis and even that
the countries participate with similar amounts of decreases.
While more studies on the efficiency of international financial market
are clearly needed, we may already cautiously infer that investors do not use
all the diversification possibilities and that in crisis situations investors tend
to withdraw their investments from many emerging markets simultaneously.
Also the events in the one-year period, August 1997 to August 1998, indi-
cates that investors can segment emerging markets as a group (Figure 9).
Herding behaviour can be seen as one reason for this inefficiency.
Krugman (1998a) explains the Asian crisis by herding behaviour in the fi-
nancial markets and gives two reasons. First, there is a bandwagon effect
driven by the investor’s awareness or expectations that the other investors
have private information. When one investor sells, the others sell as well.
Second, much of the money invested in emerging market is managed by agents
rather than directly by principals. These are compensated based on compari-
son with other money managers. Before the crisis money managers are not
enough concerned about the crisis possibility. Although the prices of assets
have decreased remarkably after the crisis, managers refuse to invest.31
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Figure 9: Equity indexes in Developed and Emerging markets during 18 Aug.
1997 –18 Aug. 1998
















Source: Morgan Stanley, Bloomberg. MS World developed and MS Emerging
markets are Morgan Stanley’s indexes in USD terms. For Russia the index is the
RTS index.
Calvo – Mendoza (1997) studied international portfolio diversification with
incomplete information. Their reasoning for herding behaviour is that the
expected utility gain made by paying the cost of processing country-specific
information falls as the number of investable countries grows.39 Emerging
market countries are the latest, where the research departments are built. In
emerging markets processing information is highly expensive and sometimes
even impossible to receive. Because of lack information emerging markets
are, thus, more vulnerable to herding behaviour than developed ones.
In the Russian financial market this bandwagon was also in effect. Dur-
ing the capital inflow period, January 1997 – October 1997, GKO- and eq-
uity markets rallied. Many hedge funds wanted to invest in Russia without
enough accurate information; what are the financial ratios of enterprises,
what is the actual balance of the federal budget, or even what is the GDP
growth rate of the economy? Public administration, enterprises and invest-
ment banks were not ready to grant all the information. Consequently, in32
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January 1999 the value of the 200 largest enterprises in Russia is around
USD 20 billion and the value of Nokia (largest enterprise in Finland) is around
USD 60 billion. Nobody wants to take the risk and invest in Russia again.
3 Conclusion
Different theories explain different crises. For the Asian crisis, new currency
crisis theories might be most appropriate. These are particularly based on
inadequate regulation of the banking or financial sector, which then after
liberalisation of capital markets, cause over-lending and over-investments in
the economy.
In Russia’s case, basic weaknesses in the economy rendered the country
inefficient and inclined to crisis. The acute reason for the currency crisis was
the long-term deficit of the federal budget. This rendered the stock of debt
unsustainable for the government to service and argumented expectations of
future money creation. A minor reason was the short-term maturity of the
rouble debt, which then made Kiriyenko’s government insolvent. These poor
government finances created expectations of central bank finances. The Asian
crisis helped trigger the Russian crisis. After the Asian crisis, investors moni-
tored country fundamentals more carefully. Moreover, it may well be the
investors are now more risk-averse towards emerging markets as a group as
well. And hopefully, after the Russian default private investors might start to
insist more solvent finances from governments and from other debtors in all
emerging markets.
Although low raw material prices diminished the Russian trade surplus,
current account deficits were not reasons for the Russian crisis. Unlike the
Asian crisis, over-lending by the Russian banks was not a reason for the
crisis either, although their inability to protect themselves against exchange
rate movements rendered the crisis more worse. Russia and the Kiriyenko’s
government had bad luck, but the main reasons for the crisis are the own
mistakes by the Russians – the long-time federal budget deficit. Thus, the
repairs should also start from there. The long-term repairs should also take
up the basic weaknesses of the economy and build trustworthy public insti-
tutions into the country. Unfortunately, the Primakov’s government remedy -
new money creation - will make the currency crisis worse and postpone re-
covery far into the future.33
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The fact that fundamental weaknesses exists, means that countries should
repair their own weaknesses in currency crisis situations. Also, some aspects
of the current crisis defy conventional explanation. Why did the crisis in
1997-1998 contagiously spread from one emerging market to another? Per-
haps, in an environment where capital is highly mobile, the lack of informa-
tion is an explanation. Building an information infrastructure, more strict
monitoring of the country fundamentals and banking regulation might be
some starting points for the IMF to consider as it assembles its blueprints for
building an infrastructure for global capital markets.34
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Notes
1 Economist, Institute for Economies in Transition, Bank of Finland, e-mail:
tuomas.komulainen@bof.fi. All opinions expressed are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Finland. The author would like to
thank Lauri Kajanoja for his comments.
2 See Kindleberger 1978 for good review on the history of financial crisis.
3 This classification to four currency crisis periods is made by Esquivel – Larrain
1998. However, particularly in emerging market countries there have been more
currency crises.
4 If capital flows only towards high growth country, capital flows may become too
procyclical and might also be harmful, see Stiglitz 1998. See also Obstfeld 1998 for
clever arguments in favour of free capital mobility.
5 Net capital flows include: net direct investment, net portfolio investment, official-
, private borrowing, other long- and short-term net investment flows, IMF 1998.
6 In 1996 an academic discussion emerged whether a currency crisis is self-fulfilling
or are the crises caused mainly by the country fundamentals, e.g. Krugman 1996,
Obstfeld 1996b and Eichengreen - Wyplosz - Rose 1996.
7 The characteristics given here follow largely the one given in Sutela, 1998b.
8 See Blasi 1997. Often in Russia the outsider, especially a foreign owner, is not
represented in the board of directors. Secondly, the supposed outsider owner is actu-
ally a holding company own by the insiders themselves. These holding companies
have been created most likely because of tax evasion reasons.
9 The Goskomstat does not adjust its savings rate figure by household sales of hard
currency, currency purchases to pay shuttle import and hard currency spent abroad,
see RECEP 1996.
10 The expression and partly the virtual economy story explained Gaddy and Ickes is
based on the report by Inter-Agency Balance-Sheet Commission with P.A. Karpov
as a chairman.
11 For discussion as to how well first and second generation theories explain the
recent currency crisis in Asia, see Corsetti et al. 1998.
12 This definition is according to Solnik 1996. Later we mention also seigniorage
revenues and the portfolio balance approach as special cases. A more extended defi-35
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nition and survey of the exchange rate determination theories can be seen e.g. in
Pentecost 1993 or Rosenberg 1996.
13 See Krajnyark and Zettelmeyer 1998 for wage levels in transition countries and
some calculations how competitive the economies were.
14 Major cases of need for seigniorage revenues, hyperinflation, and free fall of the
value of the currency are: Germany 1922–23, Mexico 1982, Argentina 1982, see e.g.
Corsetti et al. 1998. Although excessive money creation is not so common these
days, the option is always there. Thus, the independence of central banks has been
cited as a main indicator of credible and stable currency, Alesina et al. 1993.
15 The stock of debt figures are most likely higher as there are domestic debt items,
like wage arrears and even some domestic debt items, which are not included. These
figures might add around 5 % to figures given here.
16 Recent cases where the excessive current account deficits at least partly caused
currency crises are Mexico in 1994 and Thailand in 1997, e.g. Martinez 1998. Ex-
cessive inflation may cause trade deficit. If costs in a country rise so that enterprises
lose their price competitiveness, the trade balance will worsen and the exchange rate
may come under attack.
17 See study by Rautava 1998 for the errors in the foreign trade data between Russia
and Finland. Secondly, the negative service balance in Russia diminished the current
account surplus already in 1997.
18 In the latter case, credit expansion is dependent on a random component.
19 Krugman 1996, Obstfeld 1996a and Esquivel – Larrain 1998 have all a summary,
but have also slightly different interpretations to the first generation theories on cur-
rency crisis. On the rational expectations, government deficit and depreciation of the
currency see Sargent 1986.
20 A second example of costs is a high debt denominated in domestic currency. This
gives the government justification to inflate the debt away by abandoning the peg. In
addition, Obstfeld 1994 cleverly notes that for countries with access to world capital
markets, reserve adequacy per se is far less a concern than it was in the early 1970s;
it is the authorities’ willingness to endure the costs.
21 Obstfeld 1996a study uses a game theory approach. When the authorities have an
intermediate level of reserves, investors have to coordinate their actions to make the
attack successful and profitable. The two Nash equilibria are: one where the attack is36
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successful, many investors attack and make a profit, or there is no attack and no rent
seeking.
22 Obstfeld 1994 leaves it a bit obscure as to what is the trigger for currency depre-
ciation expectations. The trigger might be fundamentals. Obstfeld 1994 mentions,
for example, the negative vote on Maastricht treaty by the Danish as an trigger for
the EMS crises.
23 Since wages are set at the earlier period the government might attempt a ”surprise”
devaluation to increase price competitiveness in the country, which might increase
the devaluation expectations even further, see Obstfeld 1994.
24 Banks liabilities are usually short-term maturity and assets long-term. In many
emerging markets countries the devaluation itself causes problems for banks, which
have liabilities denominated in foreign currency.
25 A political commitment might also be a reason for self-fulfilling crisis (Krugman
1997). The EMS crisis is the clearest example of this. Once Britain and Italy left the
system, it raised expectations that it was easier for other governments to abandon the
system as well. This expectation caused the capital flows and the collapse (or change)
of the system, although the governments were actually unwilling to abandon the
system.
26 In the regression tests both Eichengreen – Rose – Wyplosz 1996 and Esquivel –
Larrain 1998 found that the foreign effect (contagious effect) is statistically signifi-
cant to the domestic currency, and that a crisis in one country raises the contempora-
neous probability of crisis for all countries of the region by more than 7 percent.
Both tests use a time span of more than 30 years, which might understate the conta-
gion effect in today’s environment.
27 The definition for contagion effect used here follows the definition in Masson
1998 and in Esquivel – Larrain 1998. However, is the reason for the simultaneous
currency crisis the spillover (trade) or contagion (sentiment) effect, is hard to meas-
ure and depends by the currency crisis case.
28 At the time in which their currencies were allowed to float Taiwan and Singapore
had a massive stock of foreign reserves ($80b in Singapore and $100b in Taiwan)
and strong fundamentals (current account surplus and small stock of foreign debt),
e.g. Corsetti et al. 1998. Thus, in these cases a competitive devaluation model is
useful. However, according to Alba et al. 1998, competitive devaluation is not the
reason for the Asian crisis. According to their calculations: 10–20 % devaluations by37
Currency crisis theories — some explanations for the Russian case
BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/1999
neighbouring countries increase the needed depreciation by the other countries only
by half to one-percentage points, Alba et al. 1998.
29 This was said to be one of the reasons for the EMS crisis, e.g. Bayomi – Eichengreen
1993, and to the debt crisis in developing countries in 1982, e.g. Masson 1998.
30 During the 1997–98 crisis in Asia the Federal Reserve only considered raising its
key interest rates in the spring 1997. However, the sentiment in the Federal Reserve
and in some European central banks changed in winter 1997 from loosening towards
tightening. This might have been one reason to the change in the capital flows to-
wards developed away from emerging markets. Studying the currency crisis in Latin
America in 1994–95 Godfajn – Valdes 1997 conclude: it is difficult to justify how
the rather modest changes in U.S. interest rates can determine the magnitude of these
capital outflows. Uribe 1998 observed that the Federal Reserve raised its key rates
from 3 % to 6 % between January, 1994 and February, 1995 and points this as one
reason for the capital outflow from emerging market in 1995 crisis. But according to
Uribe it fails to explain the timing of the crisis in Latin America at the first quarter of
1995.
31 Based on the just mentioned indicators Masson (1998) calculates a fundamental
parameter for 13 emerging market countries during 1994–96. If this parameter is
high enough, multiple equilibria are not possible and speculative attack should not
occur. Most of the countries involved in the 1994–95 or 1997–98 crises (besides
Brazil and Thailand) were noted in the study.
32 The empirical part in the Kaminsky – Reinhardt (1996) study provides the interest-
ing result that in half of the studied cases, the banking crisis gets underway before
the balance of payments crisis. Even more interesting, 71 % these banking crises
were preceded by financial liberalisation. They conclude that the financial sector
liberalisation usually came without an adequate regulatory and supervisory frame-
work to accompany it. Also the study Kaminsky – Reinhardt – Lizondo 1998 list the
banking crisis as an leading indicator for currency crisis, but did not found that cur-
rency crisis cause banking crisis.
33 The size of external debt and the structure of it in Asian crisis countries is listed in
Corsetti et al. 1998.
34 Chang – Velasco 1998 stress that this illiquidity story is more suitable for emerg-
ing markets, because non-banks play only minority role in debt and equity markets.
Moreover, the access of emerging market banks to world capital is more limited. In
case of illiquidity, banks just can’t receive emergency funds from international pri-38
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vate capital markets. Chang – Velasco conclude that central banks acting as lender of
last resort, fixed exchange rates and insufficient reserves (illiquidity), makes cur-
rency crisis at the end unavoidable if investors sentiment turns negative.
35 One indicator widely used by investors is the short-term debt compared to interna-
tional reserves, which indicates the total public insolvency. This was at least partly
the case in Mexico in 1994, see Calvo 1998, and in Russia in 1998, see JP Morgan
and CSFB reports.
36 This is a problematic question for economists. If financial markets would be glo-
bally inefficient, free capital movement would not be worth supporting. Moreover,
big investors like George Soros could influence the markets. See Krugman 1996 and
1998a for the role of big investors.
37 The well-known problem in testing the efficiency of world financial markets is to
find the true market portfolio in the case of ICAPM or to find the relevant risk fac-
tors in the case of IAPT.
38 Partial market segmentation can be caused by costs associated with transaction
costs, information costs, different taxation or legal restriction, see Stulz 1981 and
Eun – Janakiraman 1986.
39 More accurately, Calvo – Mendoza 1997 found that if the block of emerging econo-
mies is viewed as segmented market, investors will rationally choose not to asses the
veracity of country-specific rumours if fixed information costs exceed 1/6 of the
mean portfolio return prior to the emergence of the rumour.39
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